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Quality Standards for Digital Forensics: Learning from Experience 
in England & Wales 
Abstract 
The Forensic Science Regulator has the role of setting quality standards for forensic 
science in the Criminal Justice System (CJS) in England and Wales. The current 
requirement is for organisations carrying out digital forensics to gain accreditation to 
the international standard ISO/IEC 17025 and the Forensic Science Regulator’s 
Codes of Practice and Conduct. The aim of this requirement is to embed a 
systematic approach to quality, including understanding methods, validating software 
and systems, understanding risks, ensuring that all involved in the crime scene to 
court process have the skills and competence they need and the appropriate 
equipment and environment for the work, and providing ongoing assurance of quality 
through audit and proficiency tests. However, the challenge of implementing the 
standards in digital forensics should not be underestimated, particularly in an 
environment where there is insufficient capacity to meet a growing demand for 
services in an area of increasing complexity and fragmented delivery. It is therefore 
timely to review available data to determine the extent to which accreditation to 
ISO/IEC 17025 is addressing quality issues in digital forensics and consider what 
changes and resources could be made available to assist with implementation of 
quality systems.  
Keywords quality assurance; quality standards; accreditation; skills; competence; 
validity; regulation 
1. Introduction 
Digital forensics is the process by which information is extracted from digital systems 
or data storage media, rendered into a useable form, processed and interpreted for 
the purpose of obtaining intelligence for use in investigations, or evidence for use in 
criminal proceedings. The scope includes, but is not restricted to, aspects such as 
remote storage and systems associated with computing, imaging, image 
comparison, video processing and enhancement (including CCTV), audio analysis, 
satellite navigation, communications; emerging technologies will also form part of the 
scope. Digital forensic methods will typically include evaluation of the approach to be 
taken, choice of tool(s), quality checks and production of reports. Ensuring that 
digital forensics, like all forms of forensic science, is delivered to the appropriate 
level of quality for its use in a CJS is not in itself contentious. Casey (2019) gave the 
stark warning that “as more criminal investigations involve digital traces in increasing 
amounts and complexity, the quality of digital forensic results is decreasing and 
comprehension of cybercrime is diminishing” and Jones and Vidalis (2019) warned 
of increasing concerns with regard to the veracity of commercial tools relied on by 
digital forensics practitioners; this concern underlines the need to ensure that 
methods used in the CJS, of which tools are a part, are validated and their limitations 
understood. 
Introduction of new types of scientific or technical evidence in a criminal justice 
context without sufficient scrutiny has led to assumptions of validity that were 
unjustified and to some practitioners giving opinion in a range of physical forensic 
science disciplines over many years, using methods lacking scientific rigour (e.g. 
Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Community, National 
Research Council, 2009; President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology, 2016; Ward et al., 2017). A particularly extreme example, where 
comparison microscopy of hairs was used to reach conclusive opinions on identity 
has led to a review of every such case carried out by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (Federal Bureau of Investigation / Department of Justice, 2015). The 
impact of such failures to apply scientifically robust principles is far-reaching in 
criminal justice terms, in personal terms for those directly impacted and in financial 
terms, given the vast cost of retrospective reviews.  
However, the means by which quality of digital forensics should be assured has 
been the topic of intense debate (e.g. Casey, 2006; evidence to the House of Lords 
inquiry into forensic science, 2018-2019; Jones and Vidalis, 2019; Marshall and 
Paige, 2018; Page et al., 2019; Sommer, 2018). To provide context to the debate, 
Figure 1 illustrates the types of standards and guidance discussed.  
 
Figure 1: Types of standard. The accreditation standard ISO/IEC 17025 sets out what must be 
achieved, and not a detailed description of how it must be done. Setting a standard at this level 
enables organisations to innovate and find the way of achieving the standard that suits them. 
Organisations may choose to follow additional guidance (such as that in ISO 27037) to enable them 
to meet some of the high-level technical requirements in ISO/IEC 17025 or may choose to define their 
own manner of operating. ISO/IEC 17025 covers the activities not just of practitioners at the bench, 
but also the system in which they work, with requirements for “top management” to be accountable for 
quality; audit, review and improvement are all expected, A full description of the ISO 27000 series is 
given by Cusack (2019). 
Sommer (2018) argued that a “messy” combination of a range of standards for data 
acquisition, together with a state-sponsored certification scheme for individuals, case 
by case scrutiny in courts and “informed informal recommendations” may be the best 
approach. His concerns related to the applicability of accreditation to the 
international standard ISO/IEC 170251, included costs and the unique features of 
digital forensics, for example the rate of change and need to deploy novel techniques 
rapidly. We note that the Forensic Science Regulator’s Codes of Practice and 
Conduct (2017; hereafter referred to as “the Codes”) allow for use of novel methods 
prior to accreditation provided that the customer understands the extent to which it is 
validated prior to commissioning. This allowance is not intended as an alternative to 
the usual requirement for accreditation, but reflects the need on occasion, 
particularly in the field of digital forensics, for novel methods to be introduced more 
quickly than accreditation can be obtained. Jones and Vidalis (2019) stated that 
ISO/IEC 17025 is not fit for purpose in relation to digital forensics but gives no 
specific justification for this assertion. Whilst noting that external evaluation is not an 
end in itself, Casey (2006) argues against “trading justice for cost savings”, given the 
potential impact of digital evidence on individuals’ freedom. Page et al (2019) note 
that as among the newest forensic science disciplines, digital forensics could have 
built on learning from established disciplines, but arguably has the least robust 
quality management procedures; they conclude in favour of integrating additional 
quality measures and meeting the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025 and the Codes. 
Marshall and Paige (2018) argue that, provided clear technical specifications are set, 
verification and validation requirements in ISO/IEC 17025:2005 and ISO/IEC 
17025:2017 are achievable for digital forensics. Their preferred approach, where 
such specifications are publicly available, has several advantages including the 
potential for users of tools to influence more effectively the development of such 
tools, the potential for verification and validation of tools and methods to be simplified 
and effort shared between organisations and more equality of arms for defence 
review of evidence produced by digital forensics units instructed by the prosecution. 
Casey (2016) proposed that differentiating between technical processes and 
scientific processes helps determine what knowledge, training and other elements of 
quality assurance are fit for purpose. In such a model, technical processes such as 
making forensic copies of digital evidence, extracting all active and deleted files, 
observing data and running presumptive tests such as automatically checking for 
potential child pornography, may need a quality assurance regime which is different 
                                            
1 ISO/IEC 17025 General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories.  
from that required for evaluation of digital evidence. Others, (e.g. Sommer, 2018 and 
one of the authors of this paper (GD)) also point to differences between the more 
routine activities, such as evidence acquisition and preservation, where accreditation 
may have a place, and the more complex digital forensic activities such as 
interpretation and evaluation, where accreditation may not fit. England (2018) argued 
that ISO/IEC 17025 is ill suited to digital forensics and that the Regulator’s validation 
requirements are placing a “near unmanageable” burden on digital forensic 
providers. A number of Accreditation Bodies have opted to assess forensic science 
laboratory-based activities against the requirements of ISO/IEC 170202 as it has 
more emphasis on the use of professional judgement.  The different approaches 
adopted by National Accreditation Bodies is recognised in the international guidance 
ILAC G193 which emphasises the requirements for interpretation, quality assurance 
and validation irrespective of which standard is used.  In addition, ILAC G27:06/2017 
– “Guidance on measurements performed as part of an inspection process” provides 
guidance on additional requirements e.g. validation, for inspection activities where 
relevant.  In the UK, ISO/IEC 17020 will be required for screening, capture and 
preservation or analysis of data from a device conducted at scene (including but not 
limited to Servers and Routers) from October 2020, but no UK-based organisations 
have yet been accredited for these activities. The workload associated with 
validation can perhaps only be tackled by national and/or international collaboration 
as the scope and complexity of digital forensics grows.   
The authors believe that it is important to move the debate from theoretical 
considerations of the applicability of certain standards, extrapolation from small 
datasets and/or anecdotal observation to an examination of the data. In this paper, 
therefore, we seek to contribute to the debate on the basis of a significant data set, 
assessing the impact, value and costs of accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025 and the 
Codes, based on data. Two primary sources of data are included: findings from 61 
initial assessments in 30 organisations and 29 surveillance visits to 29 accredited 
units4 by the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) from 2015 to 2019, and 
48 quality referrals to the Forensic Science Regulator (the Regulator) between 2012 
and 2019.  
       
2. Methods 
2.1 UKAS Assessments 
From 2015 to the end of August 2018, UKAS undertook approximately 61 initial 
assessments or first extensions to scope of Digital Forensic Units (DFU) for the 
                                            
2 ISO/IEC 17020 Conformity assessment — Requirements for the operation of various types of bodies 
performing inspection 
3 ILAC-G19:08/2014 Modules in a forensic science process 
4 Several different units were within one legal entity, but each unit held accreditation independently 
from the others. 
different digital disciplines (e.g. computer, phones, video).  The findings raised during 
these initial assessments were reviewed, with a focus on the findings raised.  In 
addition, feedback from UKAS Technical Assessors was collated to identify general 
trends identified on visits; a summary of these data was submitted by UKAS as 
further supplementary evidence to the House of Lords inquiry into forensic science 
(UKAS, 2019). Subsequently, findings from 29 surveillance assessment visits by 
UKAS to accredited DFUs between September 2018 and April 2019 were collated. 
All data from assessments were anonymised, to maintain the confidentiality of the 
assessment process. 
2.2 Referrals to the Regulator 
The Codes require escalation to the Regulator of issues that have potential to attract 
adverse public interest or lead to a miscarriage of justice. Organisations which hold 
accreditation to the Codes are therefore assessed against this requirement and over 
time, will embed appropriate escalation requirements. As quality standards have 
been introduced across forensic science disciplines, there has been an increase in 
reporting of problems for each. This trend is reproducible across disciplines and 
suggests that implementation of quality standards increases reporting and dealing 
with problems. Other than self-referral, problems can come to the attention of the 
Regulator through expert review of the evidence in a case, by concerns raised by a 
judge or other trial participant or reports by concerned third parties. 
Referrals from April 2012 (the first digital forensics referral) until the end of August 
2019 were collated. Data from the referrals were anonymised, since the purpose of 
the referrals system is to ensure identification of root causes of problems and 
implementation of actions to reduce the risk of recurrence; it is not to attribute blame. 
3. Results 
 
3.1 Data from UKAS Assessments 
The number of organisations holding accreditation for digital forensics activities has 
risen. As of 31 July 2018, 30 legal entities held accreditation for one or more digital 
forensic activities at one or more locations. The accreditations covered 75 different 
physical locations and were held by 6 commercial companies, 3 government 
organisations and 21 police forces. As of April 2019, the number of legal entities 
holding accreditation for one or more digital forensic activities at one or more locations 
had risen to 47, spread over 101 physical locations. These were held by 11 commercial 
companies, 3 government organisations and 33 police forces. A number of the police 
forces which hold the accreditation additionally take responsibility for work undertaken 
at DFUs situated within other police forces, governed by collaborative agreements. 
During 2017, two commercial organisations had their accreditation suspended 
temporarily; both had their accreditation reinstated when improvements had been 
made to demonstrate compliance to the applicable requirements. 
Between 2000 and 2010, UKAS accredited a further 3 commercial organisations (not 
included in the numbers quoted for July 2018 or April 2019), which subsequently 
resigned their accreditations when they ceased to offer digital forensic services.  
The scopes of the current accreditations are shown in table 1. 
Digital Forensic Activities Number of legal entities 
accredited (August 2018) 
Number of legal entities 
accredited (April 2019) 
Computer – Triage 0 3 
Computer Imaging 28 43 
Computer analysis 8 16 
CCTV 3 5 
Phones 16 19 
Sat Nav 2 3 
Table 1: Accredited digital forensics activities 
During the 61 initial assessments carried out between 2015 and the end of July 2018, 
3,083 findings were raised in relation to adherence to ISO/IEC 17025 and ILAC G19 
requirements with 2,972 being mandatory findings (a non-conformity requiring action 
to be taken to become compliant) and 111 recommended findings (suggested 
improvement action). A breakdown of average numbers of mandatory findings per 
discipline is provided in Table 2.   
Digital Forensic 









resulting in no 








to grant (months) 
Computer (36) 
(Imaging and analysis 
combined) 
50 7 53 20 
Phones (20) 47 7 55 14 
Video/CCTV) (5) 44 0 100 21 
Overall 49 14 56 19 
 Table 2: Outcome of initial assessments 
Table 3 details the findings raised against the different areas of ISO/IEC 17025 per 


















Organisation and Management 2.5 3.3 2.5 2.7 
Quality Management System 
Documentation/Records 
20.5 16.0 2.0 17.6 
Sub-contracting 1.3 1.2 0.4 1.2 
Service/Suppliers 2 1.9 2.1 1.9 
Non-conforming work and 
complaints 
1.5 1.9 2.2 1.7 
Audits 4.4 5.1 2.5 4.4 
Management Review 0.5 0.4 0 0.4 
 
TECHNICAL RELATED 
Contract Review / Customer 
Requirements 
3.2 2.6 5.9 3.2 
Training 4.1 4.4 3.4 4.1 
Competency 1.9 2.4 4.7 2.3 
Procedures (lack of detail) 17.1 17.0 17.8 17.1 
Practice (Poor or no following 
procedures) 
2.6 3.6 3.4 3.0 
Validation 12.2 16.7 17.4 14.0 
Ongoing Quality Assurance 4.5 7 8.9 5.6 
Technical Records 6.4 5 9.3 6.1 
Equipment 6.7 4.4 6.4 5.9 
Accommodation 1 0.9 0 0.9 
Reference Material 2.9 2.7 2.1 2.8 
Exhibit Handling/Continuity 3.6 1.8 8.9 3.4 
Reporting 1.1 1.7 2.5 1.4 
Table 3: Breakdown of findings raised by area of ISO/IEC 17025 requirement 
In addition to the numerical analysis of findings, a qualitative view on the areas 
where findings of the highest significance were identified was collated from feedback 
from technical assessors. A summary of this qualitative analysis is given in Table 4. 
Any example findings have been anonymised as the intention is to illustrate key 
points learned during the assessment process and not to criticise individual DFUs. In 
some instances, anonymisation has required minor changes to wording but in no 
instance has the meaning of the words been altered.  
Area in which 
findings raised 
Summary of Issue Anonymised example non-conformance 
findings 
Technical procedures Technical procedure 
documents were either 
missing or contained 
insufficient detail to 
ensure consistent 
application or effective 
direction to staff on what 
should be undertaken on 
a routine basis.  When 
variation between 
forensic staff was 
observed during an 
assessment, it was 
unclear what the 
expected procedure was. 
SOP-X does not describe in sufficient detail the 
procedures to follow to cover all stages of the 
extraction and examination process e.g. guidance 
on how to handle exhibit, order of examination, 
which tools to use, what equipment to use, what 
settings should be used for Imager, how to verify 
output. 
Technical practice There was often variation 
in practices being 
employed within the 
same digital forensic 
The x locations under this application adopt a 
different approach to verification of the data 
extracted from mobile devices. 
 
units.  The main findings 
raised related to staff not 
following the unit’s 
documented procedures, 
others related to good 
practices which were not 
being shared within the 
unit and on a few 
occasions poor practices 
were witnessed.  While 
this was not one of areas 
where a large number of 
findings were raised 
those raised do highlight 
inconsistent practice 
within units and lack of 
previous standardised 
approaches.   
An inappropriate functionality test of a laptop was 
performed after imaging which could have made 
changes to the evidential media. The performance 
of this test (or otherwise) and other elements of 
re-assembling devices was not covered in the 
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).  
 
During a witnessed test of imaging an 
[computer] the laboratory staff member did 
not use the correct key to control the start-up 
process and this caused it to boot-up on three 
occasions. The laboratory was unable to 
demonstrate the required level of knowledge 
and competency in the use of this equipment. 
 
Technical records The technical records 
being made and retained 
by a number of DFUs 
were weak.  Instances of 
poor photography were 
witnessed along with a 
lack of detail in 
associated notes such 
that work could be 
repeated, or critical 
decisions and findings 
identified. 
Electronic notes were not 
always traceable to the 
individual making them, 
nor was there the ability 
to identify subsequent 
changes to the notes, 
made either intentionally 
or unintentionally.   
There were issues 
identified with the back-
up processes for 
electronic information 
and security of IT 
equipment. 
 
The notes produced for the witnessed 
activities would not enable another expert to 
identify any critical issues with the process 
and identify any trends at a later date. It 
would further not allow for another expert to 
examine if an appropriate course of action 
had been followed during the examination. 
 
Imaging notes are recorded 
contemporaneously but are not protected in 
a manner which prevents alteration.  They are 
created and held in a digital format within a 
word document.  This is available in a 
mutable format within shared directory 
structure for the case.  Changes are not 
identifiable at the time of creation of notes. 
 
Record #AA shows that Person X imaged a 
hard drive when the image logfile shows it 
was done by Person Y. 
 
During the witnessing of 1234/17 a laptop 
exhibit fell from the table, and whilst no 
physical damage was observed the event was 
not recorded. 
 
There is no procedure or documented policy 
for the backing up and archiving of case data. 
Case data is solely stored on the workstation 
of the examiner who completed the 
examination. A review of Person B showed 
that the "backup" drives contain n cases 




A common finding raised 
was that DFUs did not 
have objective evidence 
to demonstrate the 
competency of their staff, 
other than relying on 
staff attending courses 
and having x years of 
experience.  Another 
common finding related 








During the witnessed test of extraction and 
processing of data method using the software 
tool X, the staff member verbally expressed 
unfamiliarity and a lack of training with it and 
then struggled to navigate through some 
settings and demonstrate competence in the 
process. 
 
Staff have been authorised as competent to 
perform tasks in the digital forensic unit; 
however, the manager that has conducted 
this evaluation is not technically competent 
to do this. 
 
The current requirements for evidence of 
training and competency consists of one test, 
this is not sufficient to demonstrate 
competence given the number of variables 
that can be encountered. 
Validation The issues with validation 
were common across the 
different digital forensic 
units and related to the 
fact that the initial 
validation focused on tool 
verification and not 
overall method 
validation.  In addition, 
the tests undertaken did 
not cover the significant 
risks in the process or 
appropriately stress test 
the method (appropriate 
test data or devices), 
there was no 
identification of main 
uncertainty in the 
method and the lack of 
evidence to demonstrate 
that the method is 
repeatable within units.   
The equipment used in Method Validation of 
[x type of computer] imaging is faulty and not 
fit or purpose. 
 
The results of Method Validation work have 
not been communicated to staff engaged 
forensic processes in scope, therefore they 
are not aware of the details of success and or 
limitations. 
 
The Digital unit have accepted misleading CRC 
errors in two of the verification tests for 
Software Y. If these errors occurred in live 
case work this may result in evidence being 
lost. 
 
Two errors were identified within the 
validation log spreadsheet relating to 'altered 
hash', these errors had not been picked up 
and the validation had been signed off. 
 
The validation testing proved the software 
write blocking system used in the method is 
not totally fit for purpose.  No other tools 
were tested or is being used. 
 
Assessments of whether software updates 
would, or would not, trigger further 
validation are inadequate and not 
implemented. 
 
The submitted validation material did not 
provide any assurance that the overall 






that the DFUs had often 
not implemented a 
robust on-going quality 
assurance mechanism.  
Some staff were 
undertaking informal dip 
checking of their own 
work but there was no 
structure or consistency.   
None of the existing 
quality checks involved a 
robust assessment of the 
technical validity of the 
work so none would 
provide assurance that 
any significant amount of 
data had not been missed 
or that tools had been 
used appropriately. 
 
The quality assurance mechanism at present 
does not provide on-going assurance on the 
reliability of work being delivered out of the 
unit.  The QA process on each case provides 
assurance that notes are appropriate but 
there is nothing in place to provide assurance 
that data has not been missed or the 
technical work has been undertaken 
appropriately. 
 
The Quality Assurance SOP is not clearly 
understood by lab staff.  The QA process has 
not been implemented. There is no clear 
guidance specifying non-conformance 
standards.  As a result, lab staff are unclear 
when non-conformance in imaging processes 
should be raised. 
 
For the ILC imaging trial undertaken in 2016, 
differences in outcome achieved by the two 
sites have yet to be subject of effective 
investigation and formally recorded within 
the QMS. 
 
ILC Round 2 – Two sets of test material 
provided. One fail due to hash mismatch with 
the expected hash. Investigation to date has 
not identified the route cause and therefore 
cannot provide sufficient assurance that the 
error has not occurred before and does not 
continue to occur. 
 
The comments in the peer review folder are 
not clear and some are irrelevant.  There is no 
evidence of any follow up action on the 
comments made nor is there consistency on 
case notes recording that the review has 
happened. 
 
Dip sampling of mobile device cases has only 
been performed for a relatively short period. 
A relatively high number of fail and remedial 
results appeared to be identified. The reviews 
have not yet supplied enough assurance that 
the required quality is being achieved. 
There is no actual policy in place for the dip 
sampling and thus no triggers for additional 
actions on significant levels of negative 
results. 
 
Reporting of results Results are provided to 
customers of DFUs in a 
multitude of formats.  
Some outputs involved 
the customer receiving 
multiple extractions of 
data generated via 
different examination 
tools, containing similar 
but not identical 
information, with no 
indication which is the 
best one to use.  DFUs 
rarely produce 
statements or attend 
court.  Frequently, staff 
have not received 
appropriate court 
awareness training and 
do not have access to 
template statements if a 
request was received.  In 
addition, knowledge of 
the criminal procedure 
rules was mixed. 
The current output from the Unit could include 
two extractions with different output for a 
specific subset.  This output is ambiguous, and 
it is not clear to the customer the reasoning's 
for this process and the potential differences 
between the outputs. 
 
SOP-XYZ states that reports are produced as a 
PDF and an .xls 97-2003 file. The row limit of a 
.xls file is 65,536. Reporting to a .xls file 
without consideration on data set size could 
lead to large quantities of data being left out 
of reports. 
 
Statements are being issued by staff that are 
not signed off as competent to complete the 
work. There is no reference in the statements 
and contemporaneous notes that the staff 
member is not signed off or reference to who 
has taken responsibility for the work 
completed e.g. the mentor is not referenced. 
 
Exhibit handling Exhibit handling in the 
main was appropriate, 
however, it was common 
to find poor records 
relating the chain of 
custody for an exhibit. 
DFUs often accepted 
poorly packaged and 
labelled exhibits.  This 
was a more significant 
issue in the video/CCTV 
field. 
 
The Digital unit does not have control over the 
integrity/continuity of an exhibit when it is left 
unattended during the acquisition process. 
 
There are situations where exhibits are 
received by one person or on a different day 
(e.g. example witnessed received 08/07 but 
booked in 13/07 by different person) and 
therefore the records used by staff to 
demonstrate chain of custody do not 
correspond with information on the transit 
document (e.g. date and person receiving item 
from driver).  In addition, there is no retained 
hard copy signature for items received or 
returned by hand. 
 
The current systems in place do not show a 
clear chain of custody of item movement 
within the department. 
 
There is a lack of records demonstrating the 
movement of items. 
 
There is no procedure in place that covers the 
preservation of exhibit integrity within the 
laboratory. During witnessed activities 
exhibits were received in varying states 
offering different levels of security and 
protection to the exhibits.    
• Exhibits were received in open exhibit 
bags and no notes were made to record 
the condition of the item. 
• One item was received in an open 
envelope with no exhibit bag, again the 
condition was not recorded in notes. 
 
Other  The forensic workstations in the unit are 
connected to the internet. This creates a 
number of risks from viruses / malware and 
unauthorised access to case data. 
 
There have been insufficient internal audits 
conducted to demonstrate effective 
implementation of the quality system and 
procedures and integration of the Digital team 
into this. 
 
The audits which were reviewed had not 
highlighted a level of non-compliance 
commensurate with what was found during 
the UKAS assessment. It is therefore unclear as 
to whether the appropriate breadth and depth 
of reviewing of the processes associated with 
this ETS have been included in audits. 
 
The main server room is an inappropriate lab 
environment.  Server cabinets are unsecured 
without doors to control access. Windows do 
not have suitable locks or any type of physical 
hardening. Various boxes and combustible 
items including a wooden pallet are stored 
alongside or near servers representing a fire 
hazard. There is no fire suppression or fire 
fighting equipment within the server room. 
 
The use of Software X in the laboratory for the 
method of processing Y related data is 
unlicensed. 
 
There are no confidentiality agreements in 
place with students undertaking a year in 
industry placement with the Digital Unit and 
nothing in the QMS to describe the verification 
and confidentiality requirements required 
when using staff who are not employed by the 
Digital Unit. 
Table 4: Qualitative assessment of issues raised during initial assessments of DFUs.  
During the period of September 2018 to April 2019 UKAS performed 29 surveillance 
visits to accredited DFUs which resulted in 571 mandatory findings being raised (an 
average of 20 findings per assessment compared to 49 for initial assessments). 
Notable trends observed during the surveillance visits were as follows. 
• The number of overall findings (non-conformities) was greatly reduced 
compared to the number raised at the initial assessments. 
• The number of findings relating to the quality management system reduced 
compared with the initial assessments, with a greater percentage relating to 
technical issues. 
• The percentage of findings relating to the management of audits and non-
conforming work increased.  At initial assessment these systems were relatively 
new therefore the first surveillance assessment provides a good reflection of 
how the DFU is gaining its own assurance on the implementation of its systems 
and the handling of any quality issues when they arise. 
• Findings relating to validation reduced as the methods are embedded into use.  
However, a number of the validation findings related to failure to review, verify 
and/or justify changes to the methods, such as software updates. 
• There was an increase in the percentage of findings raised in relation to staff 
not following the documented procedures which can lead to variation of 
processes being undertaken in DFUs.  There were no significant issues relating 
to poor practice witnessed. 
• There was an increase in the percentage of findings raised in relation to 
technical records.  This includes inaccurate or insufficient information being 
recorded in notes or supporting quality records. 
• An increase in exhibit handling issues was witnessed, with examples of exhibits 
being accepted with inappropriate packaging and incorrect descriptions or 
reference numbers.  In addition, exhibits were not being stored appropriately or 
in the locations which were recorded in the system. 
• In relation to Contract Review and Reporting, findings were raised in relation to 
incorrect or misleading statements of accreditation status being declared in 
Service Level Agreements or Reports. 
• With more Forensic Units gaining accreditation to the Codes, it was noted that 
a number of findings were related to requirements which are specific to the 
Codes and do not have an ISO/IEC 17025 equivalent, such as Business 
Continuity Planning, Staff Vetting, IT Security, and the format and structure of 
validation documentation. 
Assessment, by its nature, concentrates on documenting non-conformances to the 
specified standard, so it is more difficult to identify from assessment documentation 
when good practice has been observed. Nonetheless, in some instances, assessors 
did note areas of good practice and Table 5 illustrates anonymised examples of the 
more serious non-conformances raised against the requirements of the standard and 
good practice noted. 








 a Deviation Request Form is used 
by staff to document deviations 
from a prescribed method and the 
justification for doing so, this is 
approved and countersigned by 
the unit manager.  This process 
was deemed a good method to 
record and justify such deviations. 
Technical practice  The configuration of software on 
each of the workstations is 
managed centrally with a gold 
build of software kept and copies 
deployed on all machines with the 
same configuration. There is good 
control over software versions and 
validated versions of software are 
recorded in the system with 
appropriate reference in the tool 
guides. 
Technical records SOP XX section Y.1 provides a table 
entry which relates to the number of 
occasions that non-validated software 
or equipment has be used which is 
incorrect when it says that this hasn't 
happened. An unvalidated write 
blocking device was used during a 
previous UKAS assessment. 
 
A number of hard disk drives are used 
for copying image files on and off site. 
There are no records of the 
management (wiping) of these drives 
both before use and after use. 
 
Validation data files and supporting 
evidence for the acquisition 
workstation 1 and 2 are not present in 
the folder.  The records must have 
previously existed as printouts are 





Staff were not aware of UFED Phone 
Detective to enable them to identify 
what UFED can extract from a device. 
 
Person x had carried out casework 
testing yet they had not completed the 
competency test and were not yet 
authorised for casework unsupervised. 
 
Staff engaged in the imaging of 
tablet/mobile devices lack current 
training and evidence of sufficient 
continued professional development to 
keep them updated on current trends, 
methods, opportunities and threats. 
It is also clear the Training and 
Competency has continued to be 
an important part for the staff 
working within the unit. Records 
reviewed show excellent 
traceability. 
 
Overall the training and 
competency records seen 
demonstrated that the laboratory 
is recording, maintaining and 
reviewing competence to a good 
standard. 
Validation During witnessed activity for imaging 
with EnCase staff used software in the 
acquisition process that has not been 
tested through Method Validation or 
approved (updated versions) on case 
work. 
 
The ten test handsets currently in use 
for validation are not representative of 
what is seen in the Forensic Unit. 
Significant work had been 
conducted on the validation of 
processes to ensure that the 
equipment and method used can 
obtain a verifiable forensic image. 
The validation has used a number 
of reference disks generated 
internally as well as material from 
NIST which provides an 
independent verified source of 
data. 
 
Re-validations of FTK Imager had 
been conducted since the last 
visit. These were sufficiently 
thorough and well documented. 
Ongoing quality 
assurance 
Although the current QC process is fit 
for purpose, the QC is not completed 
by staff that are signed off as 
technically competent to perform the 
activities they are completing the QC 
for. 
 
For the Proficiency Test (123), the 
positive observations had not been 
communicated back to the team. 
 
An evaluation of the Proficiency Test 
(resulted in December 2017) has not 
been conducted or formally recorded 
and it is now September 2018. 
32 cases were seen for 2018 and a 
selection examined. All reviewed 
showed a suitable level of QC with 
notes made where relevant. Issues 
identified in the QC had then been 
rectified with supporting records. 
 
An evaluation of the latest ILC test 
was completed by the QM. A 
professional discussion took place 
regarding the value of ILC and any 
non-conformities and learning 
that can be obtained through its 
use. 
 
The internal quality control 
methods reviewed at the initial 
assessment visit were found to be 
still being undertaken with good 
records supplying evidence of 
continued compliance.  The 
combination of dip sampling, 
administrative review and data 
acquisition repeats has provided 
evidence of the on-going quality 
of their work. 
Reporting of 
results 
For case XYZ a non-standard method 
was used to acquire a forensic image of 
a hard disk drive where standard 
methods had failed. The SLA includes 
the laboratory schedule of 
accreditation but does not mention the 
use of non-standard methods such as a 
disk duplicator or forensic boot disk. In 
this case the customer had not 
approved the use of this non-standard 
method and it was not noted in the 
output to the customer. 
 
Exhibit handling Items are being received and accepted 
with incorrect seal numbers. e.g. TEB: 
P0570XXXXX. 
 
For case XYZ the records state that the 
4 phone items were moved from the 
exhibit store to the operator’s 
workstation on xx/yy/2018.  The items 
were processed on 11/06/2018 and 
then returned to the store from the 
workstation on aa/bb/2018.  There is 
no tracking record for location in this 
three-month period or record that the 
items were being securely stored. 
 
Other The digital forensics unit has not 
completed/revised the 2018 method 
witness audit schedule for all its units. 
 
The current internal auditing 
programme requires the completion of 
in excess of 500 audits per year. This is 
not a sustainable model for the size of 
the current auditing resource. 
 
Table 5: Examples of issues raised during surveillance visits to accredited DFUs 
3.2 Data from Referrals to the Regulator 
The first quality referral to the Regulator in relation to digital forensics was received in 
April 2012. Between then and the end of August 2019, 53 referrals were received. 
There was insufficient information given to evaluate 6 of the referrals. Of the remaining 
47, 17 were self-referrals, 28 were referred by a third party and 2 were identified by 
the Regulator from court judgements. Figure 2 shows the number of referrals by year 
and Figure 3 illustrates the source of those referrals and which were self versus third 
party referrals. 
 
Figure 2: Number of referrals received by the Regulator from 2012 to the end of August 2019 
 
Figure 3: Source of referrals concerning digital forensics to the Regulator 
The digital forensics referrals were sub-divided according to discipline. Because of 
the nature of some referrals (e.g. loss of data), only broad classifications could 
meaningfully be applied. The distribution of referrals between these classifications is 
shown in Table 6. 
Category of Work Number of Referrals 
Analysis of imagery 17 
Audio analysis 1 
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Party in case (or representing party in case)
Commercial forensic unit or expert
Police
Referral of 3rd Party Self-referral
Other digital forensics 27 
Table 6: Classification of referrals 
Both of the referrals concerning cell site analysis originated from court judgements, 
one of which was self-referred to the Regulator by the police force concerned. 
The referrals regarding analysis of imagery, with the exception of one police force 
which self-referred poor timeliness, were all directed at commercial forensic units or 
individuals, with two companies attracting 9 referrals between them, albeit several 
referrals related to the same issue(s). The referrals regarding imagery were 
overwhelmingly associated with lack of competence/expertise (14) and lack of 
method validity (9); some referrals concerned both. 
The referrals regarding general digital forensics covered a broader range of 
concerns, as illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Areas of concern raised to the Regulator in relation to general digital forensics (i.e. 
excluding imagery analysis, audio analysis and cell site analysis). The number of areas of concern is 
greater than the number of referrals, since some referrals concerned multiple issues. 
3.3 Costs of Compliance 
The costs of complying with the standards and gaining third party accreditation to 
demonstrate compliance can be split broadly into two subsets. 
a. The “internal” cost of validating methods, establishing objective evidence of 
competence and implementing robust quality management procedures. 
b. The charges levied by the accreditation body. 
We do not have access to reliable estimates for the internal costs. External costs are 
more easily measured but vary greatly between organisations, based on the 
organisation’s level of preparedness for the accreditation visit, the size and 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Poor evidence handling
Errors in data handling
Data loss
Invalid methodology and/or QA failure
Lack of competence/expertise
Suspension of accreditation
Failure to ensure security clearance of staff
Lack of transparancy regarding method
limitations
complexity of the organisation including number of operational sites and the scope of 
accreditation sought. 
The UK’s accreditation body, UKAS, bases its charges on a fixed day rate. Taking 
the initial assessments described in Table 2, the range of days required was from 
4.75 to 19.25, equating to charges between £4.2k and £16.5k. No meaningful 
average can be calculated, because of the impact of size, complexity and readiness. 
However, the costs to two organisations of similar size, with similar accreditation 
scope differed by as much as £8.7k (c.10 assessment days), due to the need for one 
to have additional visit(s) and extra office time to review evidence that actions raised 
during the assessments had been effectively closed. 
4. Discussion 
The findings described here show that significant areas of concern, with the potential 
to impact negatively on the production of expert reports and the CJS, were identified 
during the process of assessment for accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025. The evidence 
therefore supports the need for quality standards in digital forensics. A wide range of 
technical, administrative and management findings were raised, demonstrating that 
the accreditation process is addressing the provision of digital forensics services as 
a system and not concentrating on a single element, such as the technical 
examination of an item. No matter how skilled the examiner, if he or she is not 
supported with the requisite equipment, resources and ongoing training, the system 
will not function as it should.  Each finding raised must be addressed, with objective 
evidence submitted and reviewed for adequacy before accreditation is granted. The 
process of gaining accreditation therefore leads to measurable improvement and is 
achievable, with 47 different legal entities now holding accreditation for at least one 
digital forensics discipline.  
Quality failures in accredited organisations were referenced by Sommer (2018) as 
evidence that standards are not an absolute guarantee of quality. We agree that 
standards are not an absolute guarantee of quality; accreditation to standards gives 
external assurance that an organisation has the sustainable competence to produce 
reliable results in the accredited activity. UKAS technical assessors are drawn from 
the digital forensics practitioner community. They are trained and assessed as 
competent prior to their first unsupervised assessment, but each will have gained 
additional experience of assessment over their time from observing a number of 
assessments. Technical assessors meet regularly to share learning and minimise 
variability in approaches to assessment, although it must be recognised that different 
findings will be raised in different units because assessment is a sampling exercise, 
to check if an organisation is effectively managing its own quality. Accreditation 
cannot prevent all error, nor does the quality standard address the financial viability 
of a company, which was one of the examples quoted to demonstrate its alleged 
failure. The fact that system cannot achieve 100% success in preventing error is not 
a reason to discount its effectiveness in improving the quality and reliability of digital 
forensics work, as has been demonstrated by the non-conformances raised and, as 
a consequence, the improvement actions put in place. 
The question then arises whether or not ISO/IEC 17025 is the appropriate standard 
to apply. The core principles of the standard are that an organisation must be 
structured to support quality improvement, with defined responsibilities and policies, 
that its staff must be competent to conduct their roles (whatever those roles may be), 
that the methods used must be fit for the intended purpose as demonstrated through 
the process of validation, that there must be an appropriate environment, equipped 
with the required equipment, maintained and calibrated as applicable and that there 
must be ongoing monitoring of the quality of results prior to their issue to the 
customer. All are applicable to digital forensics provision at a systemic level. 
Standards within the ISO 27000 series have been suggested to be more applicable 
to digital forensics. This series of standards provides useful and detailed guidance 
on a range of digital forensics elements; ISO 270375 provides a framework for 
meeting some of the technical requirements of ISO/IEC 17025. However, it is not a 
standard that can be used for accreditation: it is a technical guidance document 
(Figure 1). England (2018) argues that the Regulator could, essentially, change the 
“should” advisory language to “shall” mandatory language and adopt this modified 
version of the standard for digital forensics instead of ISO/IEC 17025. Organisations 
may choose to use the guidance in ISO 27037 to assist with meeting some of the 
technical requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, but it is not within the gift of the Regulator 
to unilaterally change an international standard or convert a guidance document to 
an accreditation standard. Further, concentrating only on technical requirements 
does not necessarily ensure improvement in the broader quality system, such as 
effective review of performance and ongoing improvement. As organisations in the 
UK begin to adopt ISO/IEC 17020 for their digital forensic activities at crime scenes, 
it will be possible to monitor any differences in effectiveness or applicability between 
that standard and ISO/IEC 17025 along with the assessment approach to ensure 
methods are fit for purpose. If data exist in other jurisdictions regarding the 
implementation of ISO/IEC 17020 for digital forensic activities, we would encourage 
publication of such data, to further inform the debate. 
The issue of whether or not the validation requirements in ISO/IEC 17025 are too 
onerous to be achievable in a fast-moving environment such as digital forensics is 
critical. We start from the position that understanding the strengths and limitations of 
methods employed in the CJS is essential, in order that investigators and courts 
know what may not have been found or what artefacts may be present. Marshall and 
Paige (2018) concluded that the absence of clear requirements statements (and 
corresponding lack of transparency about those requirements) leads to a break in 
evidence of correctness for tools and methods. They observed an absence of clear 
technical requirements within digital forensics service providers and a reluctance to 
                                            
5 ISO/IEC 27037:2012(E) Information Security – Security Techniques – Guidelines for identification, 
collection, acquisition and preservation of digital evidence. 
disclose customer requirements by tool providers. They also described a lack of 
technical requirements in validation plans. This lack of technical requirements 
contravenes the validation requirements set out in the Codes; we are unable to 
determine whether the organisations included in the Marshall and Paige study also 
sought accreditation to the Codes, but it is standard UKAS practice to raise non-
conformities if the validation is not in line with the requirements of the Codes. There 
are, however, practical improvements that could be made to assist with validation 
and verification.  
1. We agree with Marshall and Paige (2018) that greater transparency of 
technical requirements would be an improvement. If users clearly specified 
their requirements of tools and methods, tool providers would be better able to 
prioritise development to meet those requirements and to test the 
performance of their tools against the requirements. Users of the tools will still 
need to validate the performance of their end to end method, which includes 
not only tool(s) but also evaluation of the case, selection of the optimal 
examination strategy and tool(s), use of those tools and subsequent quality 
assurance mechanisms, but sharing of specifications and of testing results, in 
a mature customer-supplier relationship, would bring value to all parties, 
reducing duplication of effort and hence costs. 
2. A widely available resource of ground truth data, which is kept up to date as 
technology progresses and is accessible to all digital forensics providers in 
the Criminal Justice System, whether in policing or the private sector, would 
centralise a significant level of effort and expense, reducing duplication of 
effort. Specification of what such a resource would contain and how it would 
be made available is not straightforward but is worth pursuing; it has the 
potential to reduce the costs of achieving and maintaining the standard and 
decrease the time spent in validating or verifying updates and new methods. 
A project under the auspices of the European Network of Forensic Science 
Institutes (ENFSI) is underway which may assist in this regard (Luck, 2016): it 
seeks to gather a database of datasets and a database of tool test results. 
This may assist with understanding of tool performance and hence contribute 
to understanding of uncertainty in digital forensics methods. A project to 
propose suitable areas of scope for ground truth databases, assess 
approaches to database construction and produce recommendations has 
been commissioned by the Regulator’s Digital Forensics Specialist Group, as 
a first step to establishment of a widely available resource of ground truth 
data; the project is due to report its recommendations in the Spring of 2020.  
3. There has been much learning as organisations have undertaken validation 
and sharing of this learning in the community should be encouraged. A project 
to validate the performance of digital “kiosks” for use by front-line officers to 
extract data from mobile phones in a “level 1” analysis6 has recently been 
                                            
6 Level 1 analysis has been defined within policing in England & Wales as “Logical Capture of 
standard data types which a single preconfigured tool can recover (could be limited) from Handset, 
undertaken, following the procedure set out in the Codes; a subsequent paper 
will detail this work and the learning gained.  
4. Central resources for tool testing, such as that at the National Institute for 
Standards and Technology (NIST), have the potential to reduce duplication of 
effort (accepting that organisations would still need to validate their end to end 
methods). Similarly, the provision of central resources for development and 
validation of standard methods has the potential to substantially reduce, 
although not eliminate, the validation burden on each organisation. 
In practical terms, it is important to note that an organisation’s schedule of 
accreditation does not specify the specific version of software used within a method: 
UKAS assessments include consideration of an organisation’s methodology for 
upgrading software, assessing risk and conducting revalidation as required. 
Accredited organisations can thus continue to keep up to date with changes without 
having to await external assessment of each, providing they demonstrate the 
competence to do so in a controlled manner. As experience with accreditation of 
digital forensics activities increases, it will be important to keep under review the 
manner in which accreditation scope can best be defined; as the range of devices 
being examined increases (e.g. drones, vehicle systems, routers, smart watches, 
RAID arrays, Internet of Things devices and so on), a device-based approach to 
scope may become unmanageable. A technique-based rather than device-based 
approach, which seeks to identify the common methods involved in examining a 
broad range of novel devices, may warrant further consideration. 
Recognising the multifactorial nature of risk: not responding to a need for rapid 
method development on one hand and uncontrolled introduction of untested 
methods on the other, the Codes provides a route to introduce a completely novel 
method rapidly, with the proviso that the customer must be fully informed prior to 
commissioning. 
The Chartered Society of Forensic Sciences is developing a “Generic Quality 
Management System”7, which will deal with non-technical policies and procedures 
and has the potential to reduce the abstraction time from operational work to 
produce effective policies which meet the demands of the standard. Central 
assessment of the policies has the potential to reduce the cost of each individual 
assessment, since it can then focus more on the implementation of the policies and 
on the technical procedures. The Regulator is liaising with Government to determine 
if such a scheme could be subsidised, to reduce the costs to participants 
(Government, 2019; Tully, 2019). 
                                            
Tablet, (U)SIM or Memory Card, deployed at a fixed site outside a laboratory environment. (The tool 
having locked down data recovery methods and control as set out in the Forensic Science Regulators 
Codes of Practice & Conduct).” (John Beckwith, personal communication) 
7 See https://www.csofs.org/Quality-Competency, accessed 12 November 2019 
Availability of and participation in high quality proficiency tests would improve the 
level of assurance gained during the accreditation process. Review of available 
schemes is beyond the scope of this paper but increasing the quality and availability 
of proficiency testing schemes across forensic science is likely to achieve increased 
focus in the coming years. 
No organisation in England and Wales currently holds accreditation for image 
analysis or comparison. The quality problems in that discipline are the source of a 
separate publication (Tully and Stockdale, 2019) but method validation has 
historically been lacking, with conflicting views on the reliability of commonly used 
methods, poor understanding of uncertainty of measurement, even in measurement-
based analyses such as height estimation from CCTV footage.  
Similarly, the level of experience in accreditation of more complex areas of digital 
forensics, including interpretation is limited thus far. We advocate continued 
integration of digital forensics with other branches of forensic science, where 
development of scientific approaches to evaluation of evidence have been the 
subject of many years of research. Ensuring that a scientifically robust approach is 
adopted across digital forensics will inevitably smooth the adoption of quality 
standards. 
The Regulator’s Digital Forensics Specialist Group will continue to monitor the 
effectiveness of standards as their application widens and will pursue ways in which 
method validation and verification can be improved to provide optimal assurance 
whilst minimising the burden on individual digital forensic units. 
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